Graphic: Harold Muhammad/MGN OnlineTraditional U.S. allies like Ghana and Nigeria rejected hosting the headquarters, and several African states have publicly renounced the U.S. military presence in Africa, although they have continued to collaborate with Washington on security programs.
NEW YORK (IPS/GIN) - The United States Africa Command—Washington’s latest military oversight structure for the African continent—is expected to be fully operational in just a few months.
Streamlining the image of the command is proving every bit as demanding as putting personnel and equipment in place, however. Controversy has surrounded the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) on both sides of the Atlantic since the start of the initiative, and the conflict appears unlikely to fade anytime soon.
The fledgling command, set to be up and running by October, was announced by the Department of Defense in February 2007 as a new body to coordinate U.S. military and security interests on the continent. Previously, these interests were managed by three regional commands. AFRICOM has been operating under the United States European Command since October 2007, for the transition.
What officials portrayed as a simple organizational realignment, however, many African and U.S. observers saw as the start of an increased U.S. military presence in Africa to secure resources, check China’s rising power and bolster counterterrorism efforts.
The United States imported nearly 21 percent of its petroleum from Africa in 2007—more than came from the Persian Gulf—according to data from the Energy Information Administration, the United States’ official source of energy statistics. The National Intelligence Council, a government think tank, estimates that figure will rise to 25 percent by 2015.
“There’s a steady flow of African countries that are exploring (for) oil” that creates a “pull factor toward Africa and push factor away from the Middle East,” said Emira Woods, co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus, noting technological advances in offshore drilling and the discovery of new oil deposits in Ghana, Mauritania and Chad.
Foreign Policy in Focus is a liberal think tank headquartered in Washington that has been vocal in its opposition to the command.
China is now the world’s second largest consumer of oil after the United States and has aggressively expanded its presence in Africa to secure natural resources. In 2007 trade between China and Africa was valued at $73 billion—up substantially from $2 billion in 1999—and is expected to hit $100 billion by 2010, said Khalid Malik, the United Nations resident coordinator for China. His comments were made during a speech delivered in April at the China-Africa Business Forum, held in Tanzania.
Vince Crawley, the head of public affairs for AFRICOM, acknowledged that oil is a motivating factor in creating the command but said the potential for a direct role for the U.S. military in protecting oil supplies is greatly exaggerated. So too, he said, is the idea that the command would counter the efforts of China.
The establishment of AFRICOM is a more ominous development for other observers, such as those under the umbrella of Resist AFRICOM, a coalition against the command that was formed by U.S.- and Africa-based organizations. AFRICOM is described on the coalition’s web site as “a piece of a broader shift in U.S. foreign policy—a foreign policy that places an emphasis on defense above diplomacy.”
The command has vigorously rejected such assertions. “What’s happened with AFRICOM is it put the spotlight on the U.S. military in Africa, but (the military) was there already. It’s fairly boring and bureaucratic when you look at it,” Mr. Crawley said.
U.S. military officials initially indicated that AFRICOM would combine military assistance with humanitarian efforts, a novel role for a U.S. military command.
However, this development left certain analysts more troubled than reassured.
Beth Tuckey, associate director of Program Development and Policy at the Africa Faith and Justice Network, a Washington-based advocacy group, has concerns about “the blending of military and civilian agencies and the overreach of the Department of Defense.” She believes that such an overreaching could be brought about by AFRICOM.
Ms. Woods, in turn, sees AFRICOM as “putting a velvet glove of humanitarian aid over the fist of the military.”
Others, however, see these concerns as misplaced.
Still, the U.S. government has since minimized the humanitarian role that the command will play, emphasizing AFRICOM’s involvement in military cooperation and downplaying associations with aid work.
Ostensibly, the U.S. military will now focus on training African security forces to deal with terrorism and other concerns. This could, for example, enable the African Union’s African Standby Force to intervene more effectively in conflicts, or help Nigerian security forces prevent militants from disrupting oil flow in the troubled Niger Delta.
But certain analysts have not ruled out the possibility of AFRICOM taking a more active part in the affairs of African countries.
“Sending in the Marines to ensure oil supply is the next logical step,” said Daniel Volman, director of the African Security Research Project in Washington—and the author of numerous articles on U.S. security policy and African security issues. “The U.S. would very much prefer for Nigeria and other countries to handle this on their own, just like humanitarian disasters, but there’s an understanding that that may not work.”
African countries have apparently understood the headquarters to involve putting more U.S. troops on the ground, despite the fact that AFRICOM envisages the creation of an administrative center.
Traditional U.S. allies like Ghana and Nigeria rejected hosting the headquarters, and several African states have publicly renounced the U.S. military presence in Africa, although they have continued to collaborate with Washington on security programs.
“U.S. military involvement in Africa has historically proven inimical to the interests of the African people,” said Ezekiel Pajibo, director of the Center for Democratic Empowerment, citing U.S. support for Liberian dictator Samuel Doe in the 1980s and 1990s and the recent U.S. backing of Ethiopian troops in Somalia. “It would be a disaster for any African country to host AFRICOM.”