
Drug makers hiding behind financial fig leaf
by Russell Mokhiber and Robert Weissman
—Guest Columnists—
(FinalCall.com)—Drug prices in the United States are out of
control, and rising. The reason is that the United States permits
pharmaceuticals to be marketed by unregulated monopolies: Patent
protection gives the drug companies monopoly control over their
products. These companies face neither direct competition, nor price
controls.
But what is the reason for the government grant of these patent
monopolies (which often extend long beyond the official 20 years, thanks
to a variety of Big Pharma "evergreening" tactics to block or delay the
introduction of generic competition)?
Leaving aside the raw political power of the pharmaceutical industry
and its allies, the policy rationale for patent monopolies is the cost
of drug development. According to the drug companies, the cost of
researching and developing a new drug is $800 million.
The myth of astronomical drug development costs is the fig leaf
behind which Big Pharma and its paid associates (inside and outside of
government) hide to escape criticism for price gouging. If this myth
were peeled away, Big Pharma would stand exposed. And the prospect of a
more rational system of drug development and pricing would rise
dramatically.
This matter could be resolved, simply, if the drug companies were to
open their books and reveal their actual investments in research and
development. Instead, they implausibly claim that this information would
give away trade secrets and must remain proprietary.
The industry claim of $800 million costs per drug relies on a study
from an industry-funded research center at Tufts University in Boston.
Tufts researchers supposedly had access to industry data to come up
with their figure, but no one else is able to see the underlying data.
So if you choose to believe in this number, it is simply a matter of
faith.
To get closer to the actual figures for the cost of drug development
and company per drug expenditures on R&D, you have to peel away the
assumptions and built-in biases of the Tufts industry study.
Approximately half of the Tufts-industry estimates are attributed to
financing costs, known as opportunity cost of capital. Money invested in
drug R&D could have been invested in treasury bonds. While the bonds
would start returning revenues right away, R&D returns are not realized
for years, until a drug is discovered, developed, approved and put on
the market. So in the Tufts-industry study, a "cost" of development is
the forsworn income during the period of development.
This is all true, as far as it goes, but it is not how people
normally think about "cost." As James Love of the Consumer Project on
Technology says, it is the equivalent of saying the cost of a car is not
the sticker price, but the sticker price plus interest payments on a car
loan.
Exacerbating the problem, the researchers may pick an unreasonably
high interest rate. They may also set the period for drug development as
too long—in the Tufts-industry model, relatively small delays in getting
the drug to market leads to big increases in the overall cost.
The Tufts-industry estimate is for the cost of new chemical entities
for which the industry was wholly responsible—that is, where there was
no substantial public contribution to R&D.
It turns out, however, that the vast majority of new drugs Big Pharma
brings to market do not involve new chemical compounds. A May 2002 study
by the National Institute for Health Care Management (NIHCM) Foundation
found that two-thirds of the prescription drugs approved by the FDA
between 1989 and 2000 were modified versions of existing medicines or
identical to drugs already on the market (and only about 15 percent were
both new and deemed by the FDA to provide significant improvement over
existing medicines).
Pharma denies it, but there is every reason to believe these less
novel products are far cheaper to bring to market.
Then there’s the not insignificant fact that the case of drugs
brought to market without government support is the exception, not the
norm.
The federal government supports an enormous amount of research, and
funds the earliest and riskiest portions of the R&D process: basic
research and the earlier phases of clinical trials.
Finally, the Tufts-industry figures seem to wildly inflate the cost
of clinical testing. Looking at company filings with the IRS for tax
credits on research for "orphan drugs" (drugs which treat small
populations), however, the Consumer Project on Technology found
that—adjusted for risk drug—companies report expenditures of only $7.9
million on clinical trials, less than 1 percent of the overall estimate.
Even if the costs for this category of drugs are below average, as
the industry claims—even if they were, implausibly, a tenth of the
average—this would still suggest a much lower total development cost
than the Tufts-industry estimate. Any honest examination of available
evidence on the costs of drug development suggests the United States—and
most of the rest of the world, which thanks to the U.S./industry
strong-arming tactics in international trade negotiations, now maintains
or soon will adopt U.S.-style patent rules—is massively overcompensating
Big Pharma for its work in bringing drugs to market.
With the U.S. healthcare system bursting at the seams, seniors
draining their bank accounts to buy drugs, and millions of people around
the world going without medicines, the time has come for fundamental
reform. Meaningful reform might include ending the industry’s patent
extension tricks, licensing drugs developed with public monies on a
non-exclusive basis to permit price reducing competition (or at least
permitting competition where prices are excessive), and considering
rollbacks to the 20-year patent term and the adoption of price controls.
But even these measures may be inadequate. Why couldn’t the
government simply take over the job of drug development, and then let
private companies manufacture and distribute medicines in a competitive
environment—doing away with patent monopolies on drugs altogether?
(Russell Mokhiber, editor of the Washington, D.C.-based Corporate
Crime Reporter, and Robert Weissman, editor of the Washington,
D.C.-based Multinational Monitor, are co-authors of "Corporate
Predators: The Hunt for MegaProfits and the Attack on Democracy." ©
Russell Mokhiber and Robert Weissman.)
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